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OnDaFence 36M/44M
44267 posts
12/6/2016 8:23 pm

Last Read:
12/7/2016 5:47 pm

 Foreknowledge (part3)



In my special look into the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor's 75th anniversary I ran into numerous discrepancies in what I'd learned as the official historical narrative of that famous lop sided battle. I know inside and out the views featured in the movie" Tora! Tora! Tora! " Until a few days ago an alternative narrative never exited for me. Anyone diverting from the long held guidelines were lumped into that "conspiracy theory" fringe element associated with the "grassy knoll" or "little green men visiting the Whitehouse". I have presented the alternative material that I've found in as straight forward, unbiased a manner, with as little effect from preconceived notions as I am able, leaving the conclusions drawn by you totally your own. Here are the links to the blogs posted thus far if you are just reading this or want to refresh your memory. Foreknowledge part1 Foreknowledge part2 I've put a great deal of effort into this research project. It's final installment will be tomorrow. (if I am lucky) Please take a moment to remember those men and women who have served and those now serving our nation in your prayers.



December 7th dawned in Washington D.C. as a bright crisp winter day with many sections of our government offices closed or at minimal staff. Most high ranking cabinet members "on call" to cover any eventuality that might arise. On the night before, December 6, FDR and other senior officials read decrypts of the first 13 parts of the 14-part Japanese diplomatic cable that Roosevelt had been waiting to receive.  It was clearly a declaration of war, even though it was not labeled as such.  In fact, when Roosevelt finished reading it, he turned to his top aide, Harry Hopkins, and said, “This means war.”   Yet, FDR did not warn Kimmel and Short.
 


Harry Hopkins with FDR

By the evening of December 6, it was readily apparent that hostilities with Japan were imminent, but no one warned the commanders in Hawaii.  Congressman Frank Keefe wrote the following in the JCC Pearl Harbor Report:
 
On the evening of December 6, in response to Secretary Stimson's request and at the direction of Secretary Knox, the Navy Department compiled from its records a summary showing that all the major ships of the Pacific Fleet were in Pearl Harbor. At this time the information available in Washington showed that war was only hours away. Yet the two Secretaries and the high command made no effort to direct any change in the dispositions of the Fleet as shown in the Navy Department summary. They took no steps to furnish Admiral Kimmel the information which they possessed as to the imminence of war.



General George Marshall
 
The morning of December 7, Roosevelt, General George Marshall (Army Chief of Staff), Admiral Stark, and a few other senior officials read the 14th part of the 14-part Japanese diplomatic cable, along with the time-of-delivery message that directed the Japanese ambassadors to deliver the 14-part message to the U.S. State Department at precisely 1:00 p.m., Eastern time, which corresponded to shortly after sunrise in Hawaii.  The implication of the timing was immediately recognized by some senior military officers.  The message stated that negotiations were over and that there was no hope for peace in the Pacific.  This was clearly a signal that hostilities were imminent. Yet, FDR did not call the commanders in Hawaii.  Nor did Admiral Stark, even though he was urged to do so by Admiral Theodore Wilkinson, the Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence (Wilkinson was alarmed by the contents of the 14-part message).  Nor did General Marshall, even though he had a scrambler phone on his desk, and even though Admiral Stark offered him the use of the Navy radio system to warn the commanders in the Pacific.  (Stark may have been engaging in self-serving posturing in making this offer, since by law he had the authority as the Chief of Naval Operations to use the Navy radio system to warn Kimmel and the other Pacific commanders.



Colonel Rufus Bratton
 
About an hour before the attack, Marshall, through Colonel Rufus Bratton, sent a weakly worded warning message to Kimmel and Short. The warning was sent via commercial telegraph and, incredibly, was not even sent as a priority message.  As a result, the warning didn’t reach Kimmel and Short until hours after the attack. 
 
Marshall later claimed that he did not use the scrambler phone because he feared the Japanese would overhear the message and would know that their codes had been broken.   Of course, Marshall could have warned Kimmel and Short without saying anything about Japanese intercepts.  For that matter, he could have given them a cover story to account for the warning (e.g., he could have told them that an American maritime vessel had spotted Japanese naval ships northwest of Hawaii or that an American spy in Tokyo had reported that a Japanese fleet was nearing Hawaii).  John Chamberlain commented on Marshall’s claim in a September 24, 1945, article in Life magazine:
 
By use of the “scrambler phone” Marshall could have reached Short well before the sun was up in Hawaii on the morning of the 7th. . . .  Marshall’s explanation for not using the phone was that he didn’t want to risk interception by the Japanese.  But the Japanese certainly knew their own plans.  .  . .  If the Japanese had intercepted a Marshall phone call, they had only one alternative to carrying through with their attack, and that was the alternative of calling it off.
 
It is hard to believe that these obvious, common-sense considerations did not occur to Marshall.

 


FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover

FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover received advance warning of the Pearl Harbor attack, and probably from multiple sources.  Hoover relayed this information to FDR.   It is interesting to note that on December 3, FBI Special Agent in Charge Robert Shivers of the Hawaii FBI office told the head of the Honolulu Espionage Bureau, Lieutenant John Burns, that Hawaii would be attacked by the end of the week.  Burns revealed this warning in interviews conducted at the University of Hawaii in 1975. Two of Burns’ subordinates later confirmed Burns’ account.
 


FBI Special Agent in Charge Robert Shivers

Congressman Martin Dies revealed in 1963 that his House Un-American Activities Committee, while investigating Japanese espionage activities in 1941, uncovered a Japanese military map that provided “precise information of the proposed attack” on Pearl Harbor.  Dies said that when he told Secretary of State Cordell Hull about this information, Hull asked him to keep quiet about it because of the “extremely delicate” diplomatic situation between America and Japan.  Dies also reported that representatives from the State Department, the Army, and the Navy examined the map.  Said Dies,
 


Congressman Martin Dies

Early in 1941 the Dies Committee came into possession of a strategic map which gave clear proof of the intentions of the Japanese to make an assault on Pearl Harbor. The strategic map was prepared by the Japanese Imperial Military Intelligence Department. As soon as I received the document I telephoned Secretary of State Cordell Hull and told him what I had. Secretary Hull directed me not to let anyone know about the map and stated that he would call me as soon as he talked to President Roosevelt. In about an hour he telephoned to say that he had talked to Roosevelt and they agreed that it would be very serious if any information concerning this map reached the news services. . . . I told him it was a grave responsibility to withhold such vital information from the public. The Secretary assured me that he and Roosevelt considered it essential to national defense.



Secretary of State Cordell Hull
 
In order to overcome the American public’s opposition to entering the war, FDR needlessly provoked war with Japan and then pretended to be "surprised" when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor.
 
Was Japan a model of democracy and pluralism?  No, but it was not as oppressive as the Soviet Union.  Could the Japanese army be vicious?  Yes, as it disgracefully proved in Nanking, but it was no more vicious than the Soviet army. Was Japan’s Hideki Tojo a ruthless leader?  Yes, but he was not nearly as ruthless as Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin.  FDR was ever ready to cut deals with Stalin and to appease the Soviets, but he refused to establish good relations with Japan.  This is not surprising, given that FDR was enthralled with Soviet communism and that his administration included Soviet sympathizers and even some Soviet spies.  While Roosevelt exaggerated and railed against Japanese aggression in China and Indochina, he turned a blind eye to Soviet aggression and to Stalin's murder of some 20 million Soviet citizens. 
 



Soviet policy called for war between Japan and the West.  The Soviets feared that if Japan and America reached a peace agreement, the Japanese might attack the Soviet Union at some point in the near future.  The Soviets did not want to see a peace deal between the Japanese and the Chinese Nationalists either, because that would free up the Nationalists to destroy the Chinese Communists, whom the Soviets were aiding, and would put the Japanese in a better position if war broke out between Japan and the Soviet Union.  It is no exaggeration to say that FDR seemed to do all he could to implement Soviet policy in the Pacific.  Not only did he reject Japan’s peace offers, but he rejected Japan’s request that America broker a peace deal between Japan and the Chinese Nationalists.

OnDaFence 36M/44M

12/6/2016 8:48 pm

In conclusion I believe there existed a possibility of the US government negotiating a reasonable solution to the crisis with Japan's ambassador Kichisaburō Nomura prior to the attack. Would it have averted war? That falls into the realms of conjecture and speculation There were many other grievances that might eventually have lead to war at a later date merely postponing the attack.


OnDaFence 36M/44M

12/6/2016 8:49 pm

My thanks to those who have followed along this winding path jumping with me down into the rabbit holes to see what could be found along the way


OnDaFence 36M/44M

12/6/2016 8:55 pm

Next time you watch "Tora! Tora! Tora!" you just might view the movie with a different light ..... I know I will.


OnDaFence 36M/44M

12/6/2016 9:03 pm

... flag flown on USS Arizona, BB39, after the attack on Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941.

Please on this 75th anniversary of the Attack remember our Veterans who have gone before us guarding our nation. Keep our current Servicemen and women in your prayers along with a fervent plea for peace.


Hungr4Yungr 75M
5766 posts
12/7/2016 11:52 am

I never would have believed that such blatant ignorance of the facts by the Commander in Chief could have happened. It is not the legacy that FDR wanted to leave. Thanks Bret. This is VERY interesting.


OnDaFence 36M/44M

12/7/2016 5:38 pm

    Quoting Hungr4Yungr:
    I never would have believed that such blatant ignorance of the facts by the Commander in Chief could have happened. It is not the legacy that FDR wanted to leave. Thanks Bret. This is VERY interesting.
He was playing with dynamite and got tripped up by circumstances beyond his control so now we are left to look at the pieces to try and see where he went wrong.


OnDaFence 36M/44M

12/7/2016 5:47 pm

    Quoting  :

The magnitude of some of the claims and evidence are beyond the scope of normal reasoning without the ability to question the men's motives directly.